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a crime was being committed together with flight from law
enforcement officers. In the instant case there was only the
sight of two men in a parked car and their flight after the
police started their investigation. In People v. Brown, 45
Cal.2d 640 [290 P.2d 528], we held that a search incident
to an arrest could not be justified in the absence of reasonable
cause under section 836 of the Penal Code merely because it
revealed that defendant was in fact guilty of a felony.
(People v. Simon, 45 Cal.2d 645, 648 [290 P.2d 531] .)
There was, therefore, under the facts here present no reasonable cause to justify the search and the evidence was inadmissible. (People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905].)
I would therefore reverse the judgment.

[Crim. No. 5759.

In Bank.

Feb. 3, 1956.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ERNEST BLODGETT
[DON WILLIAMS], Appellant.
[1] Searches and Seizures-Justification for.-A search of a cab
cannot be justified on the ground that the cab driver could
have been arrested for double parking, iince it has no relation
to the traffic violation and would not be incidental to an arrest
therefor.
[2] Arrest-Without Warrant.-There is nothing unreasonable in
an officer's questioning persons outdoors at night, or in ordering them out of a cab for questioning at night where their
unusual conduct warrants it.
[3] Searches and Seizures~Justification for.-Where an officer,
who had reasonable grounds for ordering suspects from a cab
for questioning, saw defendant's furtive action in withdrawing
his left hand from behind the seat at the juncture of the seat
and back cushion, the officer had reasonable grounds to believe
that defendant was hiding contraband, and a search of the
cab was reasonable.
[4a, 4b] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of
Prosecuting Attorney.-In a prosecution for illegal possession
of marijuana, misconduct of the prosecuting attorney in attempting to suggest to the jury that defendant had taken
heroin the evening before his arrest did not constitute ground
[1] See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Searches and Seizures, § 52 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Searches and Seizures, § 1; [2]
Arrest, § 5; [4] Criminal Law, § 1404(6); [5] Witnesses, § 100.
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§
Witnesses-Questions.-QuPstions nskP<l of witnPssps on either
or cross-Pxnmination, relating to the taking of heroin
def'Pndant on the evening preceding his arrest, are improper in a
for possession of marijuana.

from a judgment of the Superior Court of Alaand from an order denying a new trial. Charles
Snook, ,Judge. Affirmed.
for illegal possession of marijuana. Judgment
affirmed.
F. Marlowe for Appellant.
G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn,
Assistant Attorney General, and Victor Griffith, Deputy
General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant was found guilty by a jury
of one count of possessing marijuana in violation of Health
am1 Safety Code, section 11500. His motions for probation
for a new trial were denied, and he was sentenced to
three months in the county jail. He appeals from the
and the order denying his motion for a new trial.
approximately 8 p. m. on August 4, 1954, Nowlin
Sanders and Mrs. Jacqueline Grundy met defendant on the
street near the ·willow Hotel at 7th and ·willow in Oakland.
Sanders had known defendant for about three months. The
three went into the restroom of the hotel where they stayed
five or ten minutes. Defendant gave Sanders $10 to
some kind of purchase. Sanders left the hotel, made
thi' purchase, and returned, and the three spent another ten
minutes in the restroom. 'l'hey then visited a friend in
another hotel, and after they left and were walking on the
defendant told Mrs. Grundy and Sanders that he had
five "joints of pot" i.e., marijuana. Defendant and
Sanders shared a marijuana cigarette, and the parties sepm·ated. At approximately 3 a. m. the following morning
Grundy and Sanders were together at the vVillow Hotel.
Sanders left to get a cab, found one at a taxi stand a block
a1vay, got in the front seat and asked the driver to drive
to the hotel. The cab double parked in front of the hotel
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and Sanders went in. Shortly thereafter Mrs.
side of
out of the hotel, got in the cab, and sat on the
the rear seat. At about the same time defendant approached
the cab and told the driver that he wished to go to 12th and
Broadway. 'rhe driver told him that if his other fare was
going in the same direction, he could go along. Defendant
then entered the cab and sat on the left side of the rear seat.
In the meantime, Officers Barker and Tarabochia of the
Oakland Police Department had been observing the cab as
it stood in front of the hotel and decided to investigate it.
They approached and ordered the occupants to get out. As
Officer Barker opened the left rear door he saw defendant
withdraw his left hand from behind the seat at the juncture
of the seat and back cushion. After defendant and Mrs.
Grundy got out, the officer removed the rear seat and found
three marijuana cigarettes where defendant had withdrawn
his hand. The driver testified that earlier in the evening he
had to clean out the back of his cab because a passenger had
been ilL He had taken the seat out and at that time there
were no cigarettes in the back of the cab. No one had been
in the back seat thereafter until Mrs. Grundy and defendant
sat there. After the officers had ordered Mrs. Grundy and
defendant out of the cab, Sanders came out of the hotel.
The officers then asked the cab driver to take all of them to
the police station. Sanders asked defendant why they were
being arrested and defendant replied that the police had
found some "pot." Defendant told the interviewing officer
at the police station that at the time he was ordered out of
the cab he had his left hand in his pocket and took it out
to push back on the seat to raise himself. He stated that
he had not smoked marijuana for about a year. At the trial
he denied having smoked marijuana with Sanders and denied
placing the marijuana cigarettes in the cab. Mrs. Grundy,
Sanders, and the driver also denied placing the cigarettes in
the cab.
Defendant contends that the search of the cab was unlawful
and that the evidence obtained thereby was therefore inadmissible. The search was made without a warrant. [1] Although the cab driver could have been arrested for double
parking, the search of his cab cannot be justified on that
ground, for it had no relation to the traffic violation and
would not have been incidental to an arrest therefor. ( Cf.
People v. Gorg, 45 Cal.2d 776 [291 P.2d 469] ; Elliott v.
State, 173 Tenn. 203 [116 S.W.2d 1009, 1012-1013]; Untted
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285 U.S. 452 [52 S.Ct. 420, 76 L.Ed. 877,

.)

[2] It was justified, however, on another

There is nothing unreasonable in an officer's quespcrsons outdoors at night. (People v. Simon, 45
650-651 [290 P.2d 531] ; Gisske v. Sanders, 9
16-17 [98 P. 43)), and in view of the hour and
unusual conduct of the occupants of the cab it was not
for the officers to order them to get out of the
questioning. [3] Since Officer Barker saw defendant furtive action in getting out, he had reasonable grounds
to believe that he was hiding contraband and the search of the
therefore reasonable. (Carrol v. United States, 267
149 [45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543, 39 A.L.R. 790];
v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 701 [51 S.Ct. 240,
75 L.Ed. 629, 74 A.L.R. 1407]; Scher v. United States, 305
U
251, 255 [59 S.Ct. 174, 83 L.Ed. 151]; Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 165-171 [69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed.
1
United States v. One 1946 Plymouth Sedan Auto167 F.2d 3, 7.)
Defendant also contends that he did not have a fair
because of misconduct of the prosecuting attorney in
attempting to suggest to the jury that defendant had taken
heroin the evening before his arrest.
his opening statement the prosecuting attorney
told the jury that defendant, Sanders and Mrs. Grundy had
into the restroom of the ·willow Hotel, and that while
had "talked about the purchasing of some heroin."
defendant's objection the prosecuting attorney told
the court that he was merely stating what he expected to
and that he would not prove it if the court ruled the
out. He was instructed to proceed. He then stated
that defendant had given Sanders a $10 bill, that Sanders
and returned a few minutes later with something
hand, and that the three had "stayed in there for
or twenty minutes and then departed."
Grundy testified as a witness for the People. On
examination, in ansvYer to the question ''And what did
while you were in the restroom at the \Villow Hotel,"
slw
"He [Sandersl pnt a paper which was believed to
br· heroin--" Defendant objected and the matter was
up in chambers. The court ruled tl1at testimony conthe conduct of the parties in the restroom was admissible solely to show their relationship, but struck from
the record the reference to heroin as "immaterial and as a
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volunteer statement and not responsive.'' A later objection
was also sustained when, upon cross-examination, defendant
was asked, ''And you know the effects [of heroin] because
you yourself have been the recipient of a shot~" [5] It was
immaterial to the one-count charge of possession of marijuana whether or not defendant had taken heroin the evening preceding his arrest (see People v. Perez, 128 Cal.
App.2d 750, 756 [276 P.2d 72] ;
People v. Le Beau, 39 Cal.
2d 146, 148 [245 P.2d 302]), and the trial court therefore
properly sustained these objections.
[4b] No further direct reference was made to heroin,
but Mrs. Grundy and Sanders were questioned in detail
concerning the activities of the three in the restroom. During
the questioning it was brought out that they had partaken
of Sanders' purchase. It is apparent from the repeated
references to the restroom and the conduct therein that the
purpose of the questions was to keep constantly before the
jury the suggestion in the opening statement that could not
properly be proved. ( Cf. People v. Mullings, 83 Cal. 138,
145-146 [23 P. 229, 17 Am.St.Rep. 223].) A careful review
of the entire record convinces us, however, that this misconduct did not result in a miscarriage of justice. (Cal.
Const., art. VI, § 41;2.)
The judgment and order are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and
McComb, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I cannot agree that the sight of a cab parked in front of
a hotel in the early hours of the morning is sufficient to
constitute reasonable cause for a police investigation. The
law, as set forth in People v. Sinwn, 45 Ca1.2d 645, 648
[290 P.2d 531], is that " . . . the search of defendant's person may be justified only if he was committing or attempting
to commit an offense in the officer's presence (Pen. Code,
§ 836, subd. 1), or the officer had reasonable cause to believe
he had committed a felony. (Pen. Code, § 836, subd. 5.)"
,Just how it can be said that two people getting into a cab
early in the morning is ''unusual conduct'' is not entirely
clear to me. I had thought that it was a frequent occurrence.
"Under these circumstances, to permit an officer to justify
a search on the ground that he 'didn't feel' that a person
on the street at night had any lawful business there would
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his person searched by any susofficer no matter how unfounded the suspicions were.
to or from
jobs or entertainor
for exercise or
would suffer
'With the occasional criminal who would be turned up.''
,Justice
speaking for the court, in People v.
sup1~a, at pp. 650, 651.) If: the sight of two people
into a taxicab in front of a hotel early in the mornconstitutes reasonable cause to believe that a felony is
"'"'""'""'· then any couple out for an evening of entermay be subjected to police surveillance and search.
the words of Mr. Justice Jackson (United States
332 U.S. 581, 595 [68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210], is a
er danger to a free people than the escape of some
from punishment.''
It would appear that the salutary rule of People v. Cahan,
44 Cal.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905], is to be circumscribed by an
and unwarranted extension of the concept of what
consti1ntes reasonable cause. In People v. Martin, ante,
p. O(i [2!}:1 P.2d G2], thP sight of two mw parked in
an automobile at night vvas held to constitute reasonable cause
for a police investigation and warrant a search of their
pen;ons and automobile; here, the sight of a man and woman
in a cab in front of a hotel in the early hours of the
is held to constitute reasonable cause for police
and a search of their persons and the taxicab.
no answer that the search showed illegal possession of
nareoties since the search may not be justified because it,
shows that the defendant was guilty of a felony.
v. B1"'0W11, 45 Cal.2d 640 [290 P.2d fi28l ; People
43 Ca1.2d 645 1290 P.2d fi3l].)
the majority opinion it is stated that Officer Barker
had reasonable grounds to believe that defendant was hiding
contraband because of his ''furtive action'' in getting out
of ihe cab for f)nestioning. In Carroll v. United States, 267
U
1
160 [4fi S.Ct. 280, 6rl T.1.Ed. 543, 39 A.I1.R. 790], the
comt very carefully and at length set forth the evidence
and noted that the officers had known of the bootlegging
activities of the defendants for two months prior to the
sear<~h and seiznre; in Husty v. United Btates, 282 U.S. 694
[51 S.Ct. 240, 75 L.Ed. 629, 74 A.L.R. 1407], the officer had
reeeived prior, reliable information that Hnsty was carrying
eontraband; in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 [69
1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879], the officer conducting the search
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had arrested the defendant some five months prior to the
search for carrying liquor and had seen him on at least two
the search loading
occasions in the six months
liquor in his car which, on the day in
appeared to
be heavily loaded with what the defendant admitted to be
liquor; in United States v. One 1946 Plyrnottth Sedan Automobile, 167 F.2d 3, the officer had received advance reliable
information that the defendant would make delivery of tax
unpaid alcohol in a certain vicinity. It may therefore be
seen that all of the cases relied upon by the majority are
easily distinguishable from the one here under consideration
in that in all of them the facts showed sorne basis for suspecting that a crime was being committed.
I also disagree vehemently with the statement in the majority opinion that ''there is nothing unreasonable in an
officer's questioning persons outdoors at night.'' Cited in
support of this statement are People v. Sirnon, 45 Cal.2d
645 [290 P.2d 531], and Gisske v. Sanders, 9 Cal.App. 13
[98 P. 43], neither of which supports the statement as it is
here set forth.
Because the search was conducted without reasonable cause
to believe on the part of the officers that a felony was being
committed, the evidence procured thereby was illegally obtained and inadmissible under the rule set forth in People
v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905] .)
I would therefore reverse the judgment.

